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The present work encloses an analysis related to the channels through which income 
inequality affects economic growth and another related to the sources of economic 
growth. In the first, we use two-stage estimation with fixed effects finding that the fiscal 
effects of inequality on growth may depend on the government expenditure covariate. 
Secondly, we constructed a political instability index using principal components 
analysis, and look at its influence on income inequality and economic growth using 
dynamic panel data analysis for the 32 Federal Entities of Mexico. We find that political 
instability is bad for growth, and the fiscal effects of inequality on growth are not 
conclusive and need to be studied taking into account different fiscal variables. 
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￿As the good law is superior to all men, the laws that our congress rule should be such 
that that oblige constancy and patriotism: moderate opulence and indecency, increase 




JosØ Mar￿a Morelos y Pav￿n. 
Mexican Hero of National Independence, 1810. 
 
 
The last two decades, the Mexican economy has undergone several political, economical 
and social changes that have had an impact on the economy. Following the recent 
economic crisis, it is estimated that 51% of the population is living below the poverty line 
(see SEDESOL, 2002); in addition, the alternation
2 in political power has costly adjusting 
effects in government management and rule of law. These plus other factors lead to social 
and political unrest reflected in the increase in the number of strikes and demonstrations, 
increasing crime, and killings. Rodrik (1998) argues that domestic social conflicts are a 
key to understanding why so many countries have experienced growth collapse since the 
mid-1970s.  Therefore, an analysis of growth the sources of economic growth should 
include variables that account for the socio-political instability. Barro & Lee￿s (1994) 
analyse the sources of economic growth across countries. They conclude that their model 
                                                         
1 Translated from an original text, taken from one of Morelos essays permanently displayed at his house in 
Morelia, MichoacÆn. 
2 After 71 years of being ruled by the PRI party, from 2000 Mexico is now ruled by the PAN party, 
although this party does not hold the majority in the congress. does not fully explain why the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America 
experienced below-average growth rates. 
 
One variable that is missing in Barro & Lee (1994) is income inequality, and the present 
analysis will make use of this variable. In addition to it, it is well known that the path that 
growth follows in a developing country is different from that of a developed country. 
Therefore, using data at Federal Entity Level, and including income inequality and socio-
political instability in the model, while using panel data methods is expected to make a 
contribution in that sense for the Mexican case.  
 
Recalling the results of Perotti (1996), it is important to consider the effects that any 
fiscal policy may have on the relationship of inequality and growth. In short, the current 




Our results suggest that inequality is positively related to growth. We also found that, 
among the sources of growth analysed, the one that seems to be the main source of 
economic growth is government expenditure (as in expenditure-led growth economies) 
rather than foreign direct investment. We also found that one of the main determinants of 
                                                         
3 These two frameworks can be mixed, but in the current study we analyse the Fiscal approach separately to 
look at its influence in economic growth. Afterwards, when we analyse the political instability approach, 
we use the fiscal variable as one more explanatory variable.   income inequality is political instability
4 because this variable is always positive and 
significant. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Next section presents an overview of the Mexican 
economy. Section 3 explains the data used in both, the fiscal and in the political 
framework. In section 4, we analyse the relationship of inequality and growth under a 
fiscal framework. Sections 5 and 6 use a political instability variable to explain the 
sources of economic growth and the determinants of income inequality respectively. 
Section 7 presents the conclusions. 
 
 
Section 2. Mexico: an Overview.  
We analyse the period 1989 to 2001 inclusive, because those are the available dates of 
comparable data for the variables used in this chapter at Federal Entity Level
5. 
Nevertheless, this period captures some of the important socio-politic and economic 





                                                         
4 This variable has been highly discussed in the literature due to its endogeneity problems. Inequality 
causes social unrest and therefore political instability. On the other hand, political instability measured as 
political regimes overthrow, strikes, killings and crime, make the powerful grab wealth from the oppressed, 
causing inequality. See Benabou (1996), Alesina & Perotti (1996).  
5 In case the period is shortened due to availability of some variables, we make it clear on the text. Economic overview. 
Mexico exhibited strong economic growth until the debt crisis in 1982. Collapse of 
growth continued during the financial crisis 1986, and finally with the currency crisis in 
1994 (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Economic Growth in Mexico 



































































































Mexico moved from an economic model of import substitution policies (ISP) and a 
government expenditure-led growth system, to export-led growth. And according to 
SzØkely (1995) it has passed through two stages: 1) a period of inflation control and 
strong contraction (1983-1989); and 2) partial recovery of growth (1989-up to date). 
 
According to Cardenas (2001), Mexico enjoys relative price stability in comparison with 
the Latin America average, but the Mexican population growth rate was one of the 
highest (see Table1). 
 
ISP   GATT NAFTA 
Table 1. Mexico: an Overview of Some Socio-Economic Variables 
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And other Free Trade Agreements with Chile, Colombia, 
Panama, Venezuela, Central America and EU. 
Privatisation Starts  in 
1980 
Major Sectors like telecommunications, transport and 
banks are affected except oil. 
      * Source: Cardenas (2001). 
 
It is worthy to point out that most of the research carried out to analyse how these events 
have affected the Mexican economy are performed at a national level. Regional effects 
are hardly considered in the literature. It is important to carry out an analysis at Federal 
Entity level because they vary in location, natural resources, weather conditions, ethnic 
composition, population density, importance of the media
6, urbanization and government 
expenditure allocation by the central government, among other factors. For example, is 
enough to see that a very different pattern of economic growth, described in Figure 1, 
emerges if we analyse economic growth at Federal Entity level (see Figure 2). 
 
                                                         
6 See D￿az-Cayeros (1995). Chiapas, which is a state that has a high concentration of indigenous people
7, has one of 
the lowest Gross State Product (GSP) growth. It seems not to have been affected by the 
currency crisis of 1994, as much as Distrito Federal (D.F.) which is the capital of the 
country. In year 1999, the whole economy, and the states of Chiapas and D.F. have a 
positive rate of growth, whereas states like Zacatecas suffered from a negative rate of 
growth. This simple example alerts us that the sources of economic growth across states 
are different from the ones we can find if we consider the economy as a whole, without 
accounting for regional differences.    
 
Figure 2. Economic Growth for 3 Federal Entities: Chiapas, Distrito Federal and Zacatecas. 
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7 See Ortega- D￿az(2004). 
      GATT      NAFTA 
      GATT      NAFTA        GATT      NAFTA Political Overview.  
In the political context, the Mexican system is ruled by three powers: 1) the executive 
power represented by the president; 2) the legislative power represented by the senates 
and deputies in the congress; and 3) the judiciary. Mexico was ruled by the PRI party 
from 1929 to 2000, and now is ruled by PAN, researchers called this event an alternation 
in the party in power. Given that PAN has not the majority of members in the congress; 
this creates barriers to implement new social and economical policies. For example, one 
of the urgent laws about reforming the Federal Fiscal System has been held up because 
the members of the congress cannot reach a consensus. This happens mainly because the 
congress is now pluralistic and the majority of its members belong to a party different 
from that of the executive power (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Composition of the Members of the Congress by Political Party. 
(Data for december of each year)
Member of the Senate
1964  64  64
1970  64  64
1976  64  64
1982  64  64
1988  64  60  4
1991  64  1  61  2
1994  128  25  95  8
1997  128  33  77  15  1  2
2000  128 (50) (17)  46  60  15  2  4
Deputies
1964  210  20  175  10  5
1967  212  20  177  10  5
1970  213  20  178  10  5
1973  231  25  189  10  7
1976  237  20  195  12  10
1979  400  43  296  11  12  10  18  10
1982  400  51  299  10  12  17  11
1985  400  41  289  11  12  6  11  12  6  12
1988  500  101  260  32  19  25  34 29
1991  500  89  320  12  41  15  23
1994  500  119  300  71  10
1997  500  122  239  125  6  8
2000  500 (223) (66)  207  211  51  8  16
Data obtained from the Mexican Government Secretary
FDN
Political Parties
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 Section 3. Data. 
Most of the data used in this chapter comes from the National Institute of Statistics, 
Geography and Informatics (INEGI.). 
 
GSP Gross State Product comes from INEGI, as in chapter four; it is used at 1993 prices. 
 
Inequality is the Gini coefficient of the income of the household survey (using ENIGH 
1989-2000), see table 21 in chapter four for the summary statistics. 
Schooling is measured by Female and Male Literacy rates using ENIGH for 1989-2000. 
 
Pop65 is the share of population of 65 years or more in 1980, 90, 97, 2000, and comes 
from the Population Census, INEGI. 
 
Depriva is the deprivation index for 1990, calculated by Sempere & Sobarzo (1998). 
 
Government Expenditure. 
EXP is government expenditure in 1989-2000. 
 
EXP-cntr is government expenditure in public construction 1989-2000. 
 
There is no data on government expenditure for the government of Mexico City that 
could be comparable to the rest of the Entities. The Federal System is centralised, and 
Mexico City is the Federal Entity that perceives and administrates all taxes, it is regarded as an outlier in the sample
8. Therefore through this entire chapter, whenever we use 
government expenditure, we will only consider 31 states.  
 
Government expenditure at municipal level is divided in seven accounts, but not all of 
them are available. We obtained the state level government expenditure by adding all the 
￿municipios￿ that belong to the same state. This Government expenditure level is lower 
and differs from that of the government expenditure at state level, because the latter 
includes expenditure for the whole state. Similarly, if we add the government 
expenditures of the 32 Federal Entities, the result is lower and differs from the total of the 
national economy because the later includes the expenditure as a nation. 
 
Table 3. Government Expenditure Accounts and their Correlations Coefficients 
t-1 Growth(t)  Total  Expenditure(t-1)  Years  available 
Total Expenditure  0.1423   (0.0085)  1  1989-2000 
Administration  0.0365   (0.4829)  0.9716   (0.0000)  1989-2000 
Construction  0.0040   (0.9382)     0.8984   (0.0000)  1989-2000 
Debt  0.0522   (0.3178)     0.6927   (0.0000)  1989-2000 
Disponibilidades  0.0428   (0.4186)    0.7759   (0.0000)  1989-2000 
Third Parties  0.0207   (0.7553)    0.5419   (0.0000)  1989-2000 
Other  -0.0808  (0.6829)    ----         (1.0000)  2000 
Transfers  -0.3285  (0.0000)  0.7885   (0.0000)  1995-2000 




In order to calculate the political instability variable, we use the principal component 
method. This method finds the maximum variance among variables that explain the same 
event and are highly correlated with each other (see Asteriou & Siriopoulus, 2000). We 
                                                         
8 See D￿az-Cayeros (1995) for a whole description of the Mexican Federal System, and Sempere & consider that federal crime, common crime and strikes capture social unrest and therefore 
a certain degree of political instability. They cannot be included at the same time in a 
regression, because they create multicollinearity problems.  
 
Therefore, using the principal components method we can express political instability as 
a linear combination of crime variables and strikes. The method of principal components 
makes possible that a larger set of variables can be expressed as a linear combination of a 
smaller set of variables that are linearly independent. In our case, we only have three 
variables, so the set remains the same. 
 
This technique consists of constructing a new set of variables (Ni) out of a larger set (Lj) 
where j=1,￿,n. The new variables are linear combinations of Lj and are called the 
principal components. The ￿a￿s￿ are called the loadings and are calculated such that all 
N￿s are orthogonal to each other. The first N is the principal components that account for 
the largest variance among the L￿s, the second component accounts for the remaining 
variation, and so on. 
n nL a L a L a N 1 1 12 12 11 11 11 ...+ + + =  
n nL a L a L a N 1 2 22 22 21 21 21 ...+ + + =  
￿￿ 
nn nn n n n n n L a L a L a N + + + = ... 2 2 1 1 1  
 
Once we obtain the a￿s, we use them to estimate the N￿s. In our case, the results are 
shown in tables 4 and 5. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Sobarzo (1998).  
Table 4. Principal Components 
Component Eigenvector Difference  Proportion  Cumulative 
1  2.31322           1.65989        0.7711           0.7711 
2 0.65333  0.61987  0.2178  0.9888 
3 0.03346  -- 0.0112  1.0000 
 
 
Table 5. Eigenvectors 
 1  2  3 
Common Crime  0.62550   0.34691   0.69886  
Federal Crime  0.63208   0.29982   0.71455 
























Political Instability = 0.6255 * Common Crime + 0.63208 * Federal Crime + 0.45742* Strikes.         
 
The three variables come from INEGI. Some problems with these variables are the 
following: 
1.  Data on suspected criminals is available for 1990 to 2000, but on convicted 
criminals is only available for the period 1996 to 2000. 2.  Sometimes the data reports more sentenced criminals than suspected, in a given 
year. 
3.  Strikes have to be treated differently given that for zero strikes the log does not 
exist, they are available from 1989 to 2000. 
 
 
Section 4.  Fiscal Framework. 
In this section, we follow the structural form equation described in Perotti (1996). We see 
in Chapter 1, that up until 1996, most of the models of inequality and growth use a 
reduced-form growth equation where income inequality is added as one more explanatory 
variable in a standard economic growth regression. Perotti (1996) suggests that it is not 
enough to estimate the growth equation in its reduced form but that it is necessary to look 
for the channel through which inequality influences economic growth. We can estimate 
this relationship following three steps.  The first step is to decide which approach we will 
follow amongst fiscal policy, political instability, investment in human capital with 
borrowing constraints, or joint decisions on fertility and education. Once we have chosen 
an approach, the second step consists of identifying the channels through which 
inequality affects growth and using these channels as instrumental variables. The third 
step is to estimate the growth equation. In our case, due to data availability, we will 
consider the fiscal approach; therefore we have the following two options, to estimate the 
effects of inequality on growth: 
 •  Perotti￿s reduced-form equation will be that growth increases when equality 
(inequality) increases (decreases). 
 
•  Perotti￿s three step approach in a fiscal framework would be as follows:  
Step 1:  Growth increases when distortionary taxation decreases;      
Step 2:  Government redistributive expenditure and distortionary taxation  
 decreases when equality (inequality) increases (decreases); and 
Step 3:  Growth increases when equality (inequality) increases (decreases). 
 
Therefore, the Fiscal approach would not only require performing an ordinary OLS 
regression but also applying two-stage instrumentation that may be more accurate 
according to Perotti. 
 
The original aim of the current section was to implement the structural form for the 32 
states of Mexico for 1960 to 2000. However, due to data availability in government 
expenditure variables among states, we are implementing the fiscal approach for the 
period 1989-2001 based on the household surveys. 
 
We estimate the following structural equation. 
 
it i t i t i t i it e z literacy Female literacy Male EXP GSP Growth + + + + + = − − − _ _ 4 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 β β β β  
Equation 1   
it i t i t i t i it u v n Deprivatio POP Inequality EXP + + + + = − − − − 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 65 γ γ γ    Equation 2 
   
 where  i z , i v  are state effects and  it u ,  it e  are the error term. 
 
We use government expenditure of the counties
9, aggregated by state, as a measure of re-
distributive government expenditure. This measure is used, as it is the one easily 
available from INEGI. Government expenditure is the result of adding the expenditure on 
administrative issues, construction and public fostering, transfers, debt, disposable 
expenditure, third parties, and other expenses. From all of these, it is considered that only 
the expenditure in construction and public fostering is the one that plays a major role of 
redistribution. Therefore, we re-estimate the model using this measure instead of the total 
government expenditure. In addition, we use the share of the population who is more than 
65 years old (POP65) due to the fact that they require more expenditure on health care. If 
government expenditure is effective, we would also expect that the deprivation index
10 
would be reduced, unfortunately we do not have a series of deprivation index. We have 
only one observation of this index for each state, so we used this index as a dummy 
variable to account for the level of development of the state. 
 
According to Perotti￿s theory, we would expect to find a negative relation between 
taxation and growth, given the distortionary effects of taxation, and a positive relation 
between income inequality and demand for redistribution. Our results differ from those of 
Perotti (1996), in the sense that the expenditure in each Federal Entity is not financed 
directly from the Federal Entity￿s taxation. Part of the income used as government 
expenditure for each state comes from the federal government by formula, such that 
                                                         
9 Municipios. 
10 See Sempere & Sobarzo (1998). poorer estates are not self-financing their own expenditures, (see Cayeros, 1995). Richer 
States may raise around 90% of their own government expenditure but poorer estates 
may just gather 20% of it. The remaining 10% and 80%, respectively come from the 
central government. It is a well know fact that the Mexican Government has been 
fighting in the last years to reform its Federal system of taxation. Therefore, even if the 
Federal government increases taxation, that relationship is not directly linked with an 
increase in government expenditure in the states. 
 
The estimation is performed using FE and RE estimator, the GMM estimator is not use in 
this context because the method uses the instruments and provides only the final estimate 
for the coefficient of government expenditure and literacy. We want to obtain the 
estimates of the first stage estimation (inequality, pop65) and the second stage estimates 
(expenditure and literacy). FE and RE allow us to do that, again a Hausman test allows to 
decide which estimator is better. In Table 6 we report only the modal that was not 
rejected with the Hausman test. In our case the RE estimator is rejected in favour of the 
FE estimator wheather we consider female and male literacy variables (columns 1 and 2), 
or just one pooled measure of literacy (columns 3 and 4). Results show that the more 
unequal the distribution of income, the higher total government expenditure We interpret 
this finding as a society with high income inequality demands more redistribution. 
However, the results are not statistically significant. 
 
Columns (5) and (6) in Table 6 show the results when we include period dummies, in this 
case we the RE estimator is not rejected, and the coefficient of inequality is positive and significand as well as the coefficient of total government expenditure. This results 
suggest that the overall relation between inequality and growth is positive and significand 
when we control for time effects. 
 



































Inequality t-1   0.367 
 (0.230) 
 0.367     
(0.229) 











        
Literacy t-1     -0.152*     
(0.077) 
 0.025     
(0.024) 
 
EXP t-1 0.053** 
 (0.006) 
  0.053**    
(0.007)   
 0.010*   
(0.005) 
 
Pop65 t-1   4.539** 
(0.281) 
 4.538**   
(0.281) 
 -1.162**   
(0.231)   
Depriva         -0.410**     
(0.086) 
Obs 341  341  341  341  341  341 
Hausman chi2(  4) 
Prob>chi2  
=  71.81 
= 0.00 
chi2(  3) =  65.34  chi2(13) 
Prob>chi2   






1989-2001 1989-2001  1989-2001 1989-2001 
 Standard errors are in brackets. Growth represents the average growth rate 1989-2002.  Significance in this 
table is *5%, ** 1%. 
 
 
One interesting fact is that the higher the share of the population aged 65 or more, the 
higher the government expenditure will be which is consistent with Perotti (1996)￿s 
argument about older people needing more social care, social security, and thus more 
government expenditure. However, the previous argument collapses when we include 
period dummies.  
When the estimation is repeated but alternating the different Government expenditure 
components instead of total Government expenditure, the relationship between 
expenditure and growth is still positive and significant for all components, but the 
relationship between expenditure and inequality is only positive and significant in 
columns (2), (3) and (4). (see Table 7).   























-0.548**   
(0.052) 
-0.612**   
(0.102) 
-0.409**   
(0.063) 














-0.508*   
(0.216) 
-0.357**   
(0.177) 




   
EXP-Admon t-1     0.053** 
(0.006) 
  
EXP-Debt t-      0.047**     
(0.010) 
 















Obs  341  341  372 372 372 
Hausman  chi2( 4) = 
47.89 
Prob>chi2
=     0.00 
chi2(  4) 
=95.33 
chi2(  4) 
=50.82 
chi2(  4) 
=68.08 
Period  1989-2001 1989-2001 1989-2001  1989-2001  1989-2001 
Standard errors are in brackets. Growth represents the average growth rate 1989-2002. Significance in this 
table is *5%, ** 1%. 
 
An explanation of why economic growth and government expenditure are positively 
related is the fact that government expenditure enters in the equation of national accounts 
via all the growth enhancing expenditure like construction. However, only 20% of it, is spent on that account, the remaining is devoted to debt payments and public 
administration. 
 
A simple correlation analysis will show us that expenditure in construction is positively 




Finally, Perotti’s structural form with a fiscal approach shows that the relation between 
inequality and growth is positive. Results remain the same when we introduce 
deprivation as a proxy for well-being of the population in each state, but it varies when 
we include period dummies. These results resemble case 2 of Alesina & Rodrik (1995) 
where this phenomenon will arise only under the assumption that government 
expenditure is beneficial for everyone in the same way.  
 
 
Section 5.  Political Approach and Sources of Growth. 
Following Barro & Lee (1994) and Rodrik (1998) we analyse the sources of economic 
growth for Mexico. Different from Barro and Lee (1994) that were interested in 
distinguishing between fast and slow growers, we are interested in the effects that 
inequality have on growth when we consider political instability variables. Following 
                                                         
11 Future research should use a time series of how much of this government expenditure is devoted to 
programs of poverty and inequality alleviation. Unfortunately, this data is scarce at the Federal Entity level, 
but once it is available, it will be very helpful to disentangle the effect of government expenditure as a 
channel through which inequality affects economic growth. Barro and Lee(1994) and Rodrik (1998), in this section, we do no longer use a structural 
equation.  
 
The reduced-form equation to be estimated is: 
it t i t t
t t t i t i it
u Inst Pol Exp Gov
Lit Fem Lit Male Inequality GSP Growth
+ + + + +
+ + + =
− −
− − − −
η α β β
β β β β
1 6 1 5
1 4 1 3 1 , 2 1 , 1
_ _
_ _
       
         E q u a t i o n   3  
 
where i = {1,￿,32} is the panel variable and, t={1989,￿,2000} is the time variable. αi 
are the unobservable individual effect, ηt are unobserved time effect and  uit is the 
remainder stochastic disturbance term. 
 
Therefore, following the discussions in Ortega-D￿az (2004), the GMM estimator can be 
used again as the best way to estimate equation 3. We should remember that because the 
estimation involves a lagged dependant variable in the right hand side of the equation, 
Fixed Effects estimator is inefficient and we would have to perform the estimation using 
Arellano & Bond estimator. 
 
Table 8 shows the results of estimating equation 3. Using a Hausman test,  RE is rejected 

















GSP t-1  -0.510***   
(0.048) 
-0.018*   
(0.010) 
0.174***   
(0.050) 
0.175*** 
 (0.050)   
0.445***    
(0.137) 
Inequality t-1 0.119*** 
(0.027)    
0.090***   
(0.027) 
0.192***   
(0.025) 










-0.328***   
(0.133) 







 (0.091)   
0.081 
 (0.058)   
-0.021 




 (0.174)   
Government 
Exp. t-1 
0.037***   
(0.006) 
0.001 














 (0.017)   
- - 
Strikes t-1 -  -  -  -0.0006  **   
(0.0002)   
-0.0003   
(0.0004)   
C. Crimes t-1 
(susp.) 
- - -  0.0135 
 (0.0150) 
- 
F. Crimes t-1 
(susp.) 
- - -  -0.0004 
(0.012) 
- 
C. Crimes t-1 
(conv.) 
- - -  -  0.022 
(0.024) 
F. Crimes t-1 
(conv.) 
- - -  -  0.011 
 (0.018) 
R-squared 0.3245  0.0459  -  -  - 
States 31  31  31  31  31 
Obs. 310  310  279  279  93 











- - - 
Sargan Test  -  -  chi2(77)=280 
Prob>chi2 = 0 
chi2(77)= 274 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
chi2(77)=35.3 
Prob>chi2 = 1 
A&B acov  
res 1
st  
-  -  z = -3.38  
Pr >z= 0.0007 
z =  -3.61   
Pr > z = 0.0003 
Z =  -3.72   
Pr>z = 0.0002 
A&B acov  
res 2
nd  
-  -  z =  -2.84  
Pr> z =0.0046 
z =  -2.94    
Pr > z = 0.0032 
z =   0.56   
Pr>z = 0.5724 
Notes: Dependent variable is average annual per capita growth. Standard errors are in parenthesis. R-
squared is the within R-squared for the fixed effects model and the overall R-squared for random 
effects. Significant at *10%, **5%, *** 1%.  
A&B acov res 1st and 2nd is the Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 
and 2 , respectively is  0.  
 
  
Looking at the A & B test, we find that the no autocorrelation of second order is violated, 
so we perform the two-step GMM estimation finding that this condition is still violated, although the standard errors improve.
12 This implies that the problem can be solved by 
using period dummies to control for the autocorrelation caused by the observations being 
too close one from another. It is worth to point out that this time we have yearly 
observation, whereas in Ortega-D￿az (1994) for example, observations were obtained on 
a decade basis. After using dummy variables per period the A&B test that 2
nd order 
autocovariance is zero cannot be rejected, obtaining that the coefficient of inequality in 
column (3) is negative but not significant. 
 
The literacy variables are still showing the partial correlation effect and only male 
literacy is significant. Government expenditure has a positive and significant coefficient, 
meaning that it is beneficial for growth. The political instability variable is non-
significant, therefore we decided to use the crime variables and strike variable instead. 
 
Columns (4) and (5) suffer from multicollinearity problem due to the inclusion of 
variables that are highly correlated (crime and strikes). Column (5) can be discarded as 
the data available is too small due to the convicted crimes variable. Column (4) shows 
that the crime variables are positive but non-significant. And the strike variable is 
negative and very significant. This can be interpreted as the more strikes, causes less 
economic growth. 
Subsequently we break up the data into two periods: GATT (1990-1994) and NAFTA 
(1994-2000) and re-estimate equation 3. This time A& B do not have problems of second 
order autocorrelation. The coefficients of inequality and government expenditure are 
                                                         
12 Inequality = 0.198 (0.013) but  A&B acov  res 2
nd  is z =  -3.52   (Pr>z=0.0004). always positive and statically significant. Political Instability is positive and only 
significant for NAFTA period. See Tables  9 and 10. 








Arellano and Bond 
(3) 
Arellano and Bond 
(4) 








Inequality t-1  0.110***    
(0.033) 
0.103***  
(0.036)   
0.103*** 
 (0.035)   
0.107*** 
 (0.037) 
Male Literacy t-1 -0.342** 






 (0.196)   










0.155***   
















Strikes t-1 -  - -  -0.0001 
(0.0002) 
C. Crimes t-1 
(susp.) 
- -  - -0.013 
(0.016)   
F. Crimes t-1 
(susp.) 
- -  - 0.001 
(0.013) 
C. Crimes t-1 
(conv.) 
- -  -  - 
F. Crimes t-1 
(conv.) 
- -  -  - 
R-squared  0.6613    0.1074  -  - 
States 31  31  31  31 
Obs. 124  124  93  93 










Sargan Test  -  -  chi2(77)= 51.89 
Prob>chi2 =0.98 
chi2(77) = 50.97      
Prob>chi2 =0.99 
A&B acov  res 1
st   -  -  z =  -0.94 
  Pr > z = 0.3455 
z =  -0.97  
 Pr > z = 0.3298 
A&B acov  res 
2
nd  
-  -  z =  -1.23 
Pr > z = 0.2200 
z =  -1.27 
Pr > z = 0.2032 
Notes: Dependent variable is average annual per capita growth. Standard errors are in parenthesis. R-
squared is the within R-squared for the fixed effects model and the overall R-squared for random 
effects. Significant at *10%, **5%, *** 1%.  A&B acov res 1st and 2nd is the Arellano-Bond test that 
average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 and 2 , respectively is  0.  
 
The effect of the political instability variable has a significant effect for the NAFTA for 
the unexpected sign. It is not usual that political instability would help to increase 
economic growth and mostly for this period.  

















-0.476***   
(0.076) 




Inequality t-1 0.086  *** 
(0.034)   
0.027 
 (0.033)   
0.276 ***  (0.036)  0.276***   
(0.037)   
-0.041   
(0.045) 
Male 
 Literacy t-1 
-0.168 
(0.0146)    
-0.063 
 (0.108)   









( 0.112)  
0.109*    
(0.065)   
0.067 







0.051***   
(0.007) 




0.060***   
(0.021)    




0.020   
(0.019) 





Strikes t-1 - -  - -0.001* 
 (0.0006) 
-0.0003    
(0.0004) 
C. Crimes t-1 
(susp.) 
- -  -  0.049***     
(0.021)   
- 
F. Crimes t-1 
(susp.) 
- -  - -0.017     
(0.016) 
- 
C. Crimes t-1 
(conv.) 
- -  -  -  0.011 
(0.023)  
F. Crimes t-1 
(conv.) 
- -  -  -  0.001 
 (0.017)   
R-squared  0.4003     0.0678  -  -  - 
States 31  31  31  31  31 
Obs. 217  217  217  217  93 









- -  - 
Sargan Test  -  -  chi2(77)=45.36      
Prob>chi2=0.99 




chi2(77)=    
25.54      
Prob> chi2 = 1 
A&B acov  res 
1
st  
-  -  z =  -0.32 
Pr > z = 0.7490 
z= -0.38 
 Pr >z = 
0.7018 
z = -1.62 
 Pr > z = 0.1 
A&B acov  res 
2
nd  
-  -  z =  -1.51 
Pr > z = 0.1307 
z =  -1.59 
 Pr> z = 
0.1113 
z =   1.02 
 Pr >z= 0.30 
Notes: Dependent variable is average annual per capita growth. Standard errors are in parenthesis. R-
squared is the within R-squared for the fixed effects model and the overall R-squared for random 
effects. Significant at *10%, **5%, *** 1%.  A&B acov res 1st and 2nd is the Arellano-Bond test that 
average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 and 2 , respectively is  0.  
 
The NAFTA coincides with the 1994 economic crisis that led to increase in crime and 
killing, marches, strikes, unemployment and slow down growth. Therefore the coefficient 
of political instability in column (3) is unexpected. The coefficient of strikes in column 
(4) is sensible, because it is negative and significant, but the coefficient of common 
crimes is not of the expected sign. Table 11. Sources of Growth (1994-2000) by NAFTA  Period & FDI 
Notes: Dependent variable is average annual per capita growth. Standard errors are in parenthesis. R-
squared is the within R-squared for the fixed effects model and the overall R-squared for random 
effects. Significant at *10%, **5%, **** 1%.  
 
Given that during the NAFTA period there have been many movements (inflows and 













GSP t-1  -0.900***   
(0.068) 
-0.031*   
(0.016)  
-0.124***   
(0.045) 
-0.126***   
(0.046) 
0.109    
(0.203) 
Inequality t-1 -0.002 
 (0.041) 
-0.0002   
(0.043)   
-0.010 
 (0.026) 
-0.007   
(0.026) 





 (0.157)   











 (0.117)   
.0123    









0.084***   
(0.008) 
0.024   
(0.007)   
-0.034 
 (0.015)   
-0.029*   
(0.016) 
-0.013    
(0.024)   
Politic. 
Instability t-1 
0.044**   
(0.021) 





FDI t-1 -0.0009     
(0.003) 
0.002   
(0.002) 
-0.00008 
( 0.001)   




Strikes t-1 -  -  -  -0.0005     
(0.0003) 
-0.0003   
(0.0004) 
C. Crimes  t-1 
(susp.) 
- - -  0.003 
( 0.014) 
- 
F. Crimes  t-1 
(susp.) 
- - -  0.010 
( 0.010) 
- 
C. Crimes t-1 
(conv.) 
-  -  -  -  -0.003    
(0.022)   
F. Crimes  t-1 
(conv.) 
- - -  -  0.011 
 (0.016) 
R-squared 0.6241  0.1043      -  -  - 
States  31 31 31  31 31 






= 0  







- -  - 
Sargan Test  -  -  chi2(77)= 58.47 
Prob>chi2=0.94 




 Prob>chi2 = 1 
A&B acov  
res 1st  
- -  z =   2.57 
 Pr > z = 0.0102 
z =   2.14 
   Pr > z = 
0.0325 
z =  -1.44 
Pr > z = 0.149 
A&B acov  
res 2nd  
- -  z =   1.38 
 Pr > z = 0.1676 
z =1.21 
  Pr >z=0.2267 
 z =   1.55 
  Pr > z = 0.12 
 equation 3 to test if this is an important source of growth. The FDI variable is only 
available at the Federal Entity level for the NAFTA period.  
 
We re-estimate equation (3) for the NAFTA period including this variable and find very 
interesting results. In Table 10 we show the results without using FDI, and in Table 11 
the estimations using FDI, we can see that several coefficients became non-significant to 
the inclusion of this variable. The coefficient of government expenditure is only positive 
and significant in columns (1) and (4). The coefficient of inequality that have been 
positive and significant, changes sign and is not significant. 
 
Following Rodrik (1998), we can interpret these results, as FDI causing an increase in 
inequality due to fast capital accumulation in few hands, and at the same time FDI 
increases growth, implying that inequality and growth should be moving in different 
directions, therefore causing the inequality coefficient to become negative, but the effect 
is not strong enough to make it significant. 
 
We can conclude from this section that the relationship between inequality and growth is 
still positive when we include variables like political instability and government 
expenditure in the growth equation. The most significant coefficient across estimation 
techniques and period is government expenditure, so we consider that the main source of 
growth is government expenditure. When FDI effects are not taken into account another 
source of growth is inequality. The inclusion of FDI as a physical capital variable has serious implication in defining the relationship between inequality and growth for the 
NAFTA period because changes the significance and sign of the coefficient of inequality. 
 
 
Section 6. Some Determinants of Income Inequality. 
According to Aghion, Caroli & Garcia-Peæaloza (1999), not only are the channels 
through which inequality affects economic growth important, but also the determinants of 
income inequality. To this regard, the literature is full of cross-country studies that 
regress the variable of income inequality on a set of socio-political and economic 
variables trying to account for the one that seems to have the highest effect on inequality. 
 
We regress inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, on the following set of variables 
{political instability, share of the population aged 65 or more ￿POP65￿, fertility rate,  
crimes, strikes, total government expenditure, and disaggregated measures of government 
expenditure}. 
 
Several authors also consider the economic cycle, measured by the inflation rate and 
trade openness measured by the share of exports minus imports in GDP. We cannot use 
these two because there is not a developed time series indicator to measure inflation at 
Federal Entity Level, it only exist for some metropolitan areas. In the case of trade 
openness, there are not enough data points.  In this section, it is not necessary to use Arellano and Bond Technique, as we are not 
dealing lagged endogenous variables. Performing a Hausman test, Random Effects are 
rejected in favour of Fixed Effects. We are only reporting the estimates for fixed effects 
and only for the set of variables with significant coefficients. 






















GSP t-1  -0.396 ***  
(0.078) 
-0.4057***   
(0.080) 
-0.351***   
(0.062) 








0.079***   
(0.024) 
- - -  -  - 
POP65 t-1  - -  0.256***   
(0.060)   
- -  - 
C. Crimes t-1 
(susp.) 
- 0.061***     
(0.022)   
- -  -  - 




- -  -  - 
Government 
Exp. t-1 
- - -  0.058***   
(0.009)   
- - 
Gov. Exp in 
Constru. t-1 
- - - -  -0.033 
 (0.026) 
- 
Gov. Exp in 
Admntrve t-1 
- - - -  0.096* 
 (0.055) 
- 
Gov. Exp in 
Debt. t-1 
- - - -  0.015 
 (0.014) 
- 
Gov. Exp in  
Dispon. t-1 
- - - -  -0.003 
 (0.013) 
- 
Gov. Exp in  
Third. t-1 
- - - -  0.001 
 (0.004)   
- 
Gov. Exp in 
Trans t-1 
- - - -  -0.009 
 (0.018) 
- 
Fertility t-1  - - - -  -  -0.265***     
(0.078) 
Constant -0.332*     
(0.180) 
-0.315*   
(0.177) 
-0.216*   
(0.125) 




-1.234 **  
(0.511)   
R-squared  0.0822     0.0831  0.0809  0.1297         0.0564  0.0864     
States  31 31 31 31  31  31 

















chi2(1) = 1.16 
Prob>chi2=0 
 
chi2(1) = 30.6 
Prob>chi2=  0 
- 
chi2(1) = 91.4 
Prob>chi2=  0 
 
chi2(1)=  41.4 
Prob>chi2=  0 
 
chi2(1) = 5.03 
Prob>chi2=0.24 
 
chi2(1) =  52.9 
Prob>chi2=0.00 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is inequality measures by the Gini coefficient. Standard errors are in the 
second row of each cell. R-squared is the within R-squared for the fixed effects . Significant at *10%, 
**5%, *** 1%. . 
 
 Table 12 shows that the higher the coefficient of political instability is, the higher 
inequality will be. The same for the share of the population aged 65 or more, the higher 
this share of the population is, the higher the inequality. A result that is somehow 
puzzling is that the higher the fertility rate is, the lower the inequality would be. It would 
have been expected  that the higher the fertility rate is, the lower the possibilities of 
investment in education are, as in Barro & Lee; and then the higher the skilled premium 
is, so that income inequality is higher (Ljungqvist (1993)). An interesting result is that 
total government expenditure increases inequality, but when we disaggregate this 
measure in its components, we find that that the productive expenditure, like the 
expenditure in construction that is growth enhancing, reduces inequality. Whereas 
expenditure in administration (usually inefficient) increases inequality, this last result 
coincides with our calculations of TFP growth in Ortega-D￿az (2004-2) that suggest that 
the sector of bureaucracy, social and community management exhibit in most of the 
Federal Entities a negative productivity. Results may suggest that inefficient government 
expenditure increases inequality. 
 
 
Section 7. Conclusions. 
In the first part of this work we used a structural equation considering Perotti￿s fiscal 
approach, using government expenditure measures to account for re-distributive fiscal 
effects. The estimation of the structural equation is interpreted as taking into account the 
fiscal effects of inequality on growth. We found that the relationship is positive but not 
significant, and the analysis requires improvements in the explanatory variables involved, explicitly, we need better measures to calculate a fiscal measure closely related to income 
redistribution.  
 
In the second part of this paper, we analyse the sources of economic growth, and find that 
government expenditure and income inequality are the explanatory variables which 
coefficient remains positive and significant in most of the cases; therefore we regarded 
both as the main sources of economic growth. The political instability variable in most of 
the cases is not significant. The relationship between inequality and growth is positive in 
most of the estimations but it becomes negative and not significant when we include a 
physical capital variable like foreign direct investment (FDI), which is available for the 
period 1994 to 2001. 
 
The brief study of the determinants of income inequality, in the third part of this paper, 
shows that income inequality is highly influenced by political instability, and that a 
higher initial per capita GSP decreases inequality.  
 
Finally, we can conclude from this chapter that income inequality and economic , growth 
are, in most of the cases positively related. BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
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